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RESOURCE TAXATION, TAX EXPORTATION
AND REGIONAL ENERGY POLICIES
ROBERT B. SHELTON and WILLIAM E. MORGAN*

In recent years there has been a renewed interest in the theory of
fiscal federalism by public finance analysts. This interest is easy to
understand, for regions which are diverse in resource endowments,
geographical characteristics, and political and administrative organizations, raise important questions regarding the efficiency and equity
of differing federal structures. However, when this diversity is
coupled with a crisis of significant proportions, and the respective
regions have differing views as to a solution to the crisis, the examination takes on an added dimension -conflict. The recent "energy
crisis" exemplifies such a situation in the United States, for in the
search for national energy independence, the states possess the
potential to take different positions on the crisis, especially those
states endowed with energy resources.
Of course, even without the energy crisis, there are a number of
alternative economic goals that a state might attempt to achieve and
there are various alternative public policies, both expenditure and
tax, which could be used to attain these objectives. Moreover, it is
possible that states with similar economic conditions and similar
objectives might find it desirable to form a federation for the purpose of pursuing common economic objectives; the individual states
in the region might be better off if their fiscal policies were in harmony than if they each pursued independent policies.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze energy policies and natural
resource taxation for the states in the Rocky Mountain Region. The
paper will make specific reference to coal. The current and potential
future coal situation in the Region provides an excellent case for the
examination of alternative state economic objectives and provides a
basis for the analysis of various public policies that can be used to
attain the objectives. Of the eight states in the Region, as defined by
the U.S. Bureau of Census, six are net exporters of coal-Arizona,
Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. Although the
six states accounted for only 11 percent of the nation's coal production in 1974, over 42 percent of the nation's reserves are located in
*Associate Professors of Economics, University of Wyoming. The authors wish to acknowledge the thoughtful comments and suggestions of Todd Sandier and Jack Mutti.
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these states. Moreover, coal production in the Region has increased
very rapidly in the 1970's and Rocky Mountain coal is desirable
because of low mining costs and low sulphur content. Therefore, the
potential exists for rapid expansion of the coal industry in the six
Rocky Mountain states.
Among the six states there is disparity in terms of current levels of
production and coal reserves. Further, coal exports as a proportion of
production vary widely among the states. Finally, there is considerable disparity regarding the relative importance of the types of state
and local coal taxes among the states as well as the relative burden of
coal taxation.
The paper is focused on taxation rather than public expenditure
policies as the primary means of attaining state objectives. Since
production of coal occurs in the private sector, aside from environmental controls and state mine safety laws, the major policy instruments available to state and local governments are on the tax side.
There have been few investigations of the role taxation plays in
states' objective functions, and still fewer examinations of taxation
of natural resources and the implications for achieving state objectives. 1

Among the alternative state objectives considered in the analysis,
maximization of tax exportation subject to a state budget constraint
is a reasonable possibility. A number of recent studies have investigated interstate tax exportation and have attempted to measure the
extent of tax exportation. 2 The evidence suggests that states will use
taxes which are easily exported.
The first section of this paper sets forth the basic analytical framework. Alternative state objectives are identified and evaluated and
the implications of their adoption are examined for three model
states within a region facing different demand and supply conditions.
Two different tax cases are considered: severance taxes and severance
taxes combined with property taxes.
The second section describes the current coal situation in the
Rocky Mountain Region regarding production, distribution and taxa1. An interesting study of the natural gas industry was conducted by Russell and
Toenjes, National Gas Producer Regulation and Taxation, Mich. St. U. Pub. Util. Paper
(1971). However, the Russell and Toenjes paper had a more narrow perspective in that it
focused only on the severance tax in a regulated industry. As will be demonstrated in this
paper, natural resource taxation policies cannot be derived through an analysis of a single
tax.
2. See McLure, Commodity Tax Incidence, 17 NAT'L. TAX J. 187 (1964); McLure, The
Interregional Incidence of General Regional Taxes, 24 PUB. FINANCE (1969); McLure,
Taxation, Substitution and Industrial Location, 70 J. POL. ECON. (1970); Hogan and
Shelton, Interstate Tax Exportation and States' Fiscal Structures, 26 NAT'L. TAX J. 553
(1973).
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tion. The final section is focused on regional energy policy issues.
More specifically, the rationale for coal severance taxes and property
taxes is analyzed assuming alternative objectives for the states in the
Rocky Mountain Region and taking into account the states' different
demand and supply conditions.3 One important issue is whether the
states should harmonize coal severance taxation. A corollary issue is
the role of coal property taxation. As this paper will demonstrate,
decisions regarding severance taxation and property taxation cannot
be made independently.
A MODEL OF REGIONAL INTERACTION
A. State Objectives
We begin by hypothesizing objectives which have been specified in
the 4literature and which seem to have at least some political viability.
1. Maximize intrastate consumption:
This objective would attempt to have as much of the coal as
possible consumed within the boundaries of the state. The underlying goal here, of course, is to use the natural resource to foster
regional development by encouraging the industrial use of coal
within the boundaries of the state. However, given the uses of this
particular energy resource in the industrial process, in both a static
context and in a dynamic regional development context this objective would not appear especially appealing; for given current environmental constraints and the present state of gasification technology,
the state would be in the position of having to attract industries
dependent on large quantities of electricity or coke.
2. Maximize total revenue:
This objective would mean that the state's tax policy would attempt to maximize the combined private and public revenue from
the natural resource. Some authors have suggested that this goal is a
politically viable alternative since it is a proxy for economic activity.' However, given the technology of coal mining, much of the
private return will accrue to private individuals residing outside of
the state and, therefore, this objective would be politically questionable.
3. The severance tax is a tax on the production (extraction) of energy and natural
resources.
4. See Russell and Toenjes, supra note 1; Hogan and Shelton, supra note 2. Underlying
the analysis in this paper is, of course, a political foundation. However, other than occasional mention, the political process itself will not be analyzed.
5. See Russell and Toenjas, supra note 1.
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3. Maximize tax revenue:
Under this objective, the state would attempt to use the natural
resource taxes in order to maximize the revenue to the state, regardless of the tax incidence. This behavior with regard to the coal tax
would logically be part of a more general attempt to maximize overall tax revenue.
4. Maximize tax exportation:
Under this objective the state attempts to use the natural resource
as a vehicle for exporting the tax to other states. Once again, such
behavior on the part of a state would be part of a more general
attempt to export taxes.
In order to examine the implications of these objectives, we will
hypothesize three different states within a region facing different
demand and supply conditions.
a. State A:
State A is characterized by having both large intrastate and interstate consumption of its coal, with the interstate market being the
relatively larger market. Its production relative to the national market is significant.
b. State B:
State B is characterized by having a small (in relative terms) total
production, with the intrastate market being the larger of the two
markets.
c. State C:
State C is characterized by being an importer of coal in order to
satisfy intrastate coal demands.
Each of these three cases is specified in Figures 1-3.6 In Figure 1,
interstate demand is shown as DX, intrastate demand is shown as
DD, and total demand, which is the horizontal summation of the
interstate and intrastate demand curves, is depicted as DT. The State
supply curve is shown as S. The initial equilibrium quantities in the
respective markets are QD, QX, and QT"
Figure 2 shows the intrastate market to be the relatively larger
market for State B, with the total market, once again, being the
horizontal summation of the two markets. Initial equilibrium quantities are again QD, QX' and QT respectively.
Figure 3 shows the situation in which State C faces an intrastate
demand function of DD and has a state supply function of S, and
6. These figures are drawn under the assumption of long-run competitive market conditions. Furthermore, in order to simplify the analysis, linear demand and supply functions
have been assumed.
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FIGURE 1
Demand and Supply Conditions: State A
given a national price of coal of P, supplies QD from intrastate
sources and imports from other states QD - QT"
B. Models of State Behavior
Since objectives (iii) and (iv) appear to be the most viable in terms
of a state policy towards coal, we shall concentrate on examining the
implication of their adoption. We shall do this by formally stating
alternative objective functions.
1. Maximize tax revenue (independent tax bases)
A state which is attempting to maximize tax revenue from all tax
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FIGURE 2
Demand and Supply Conditions: State B

sources may be viewed as having an objective function of the following form:
Maximize: R,

=

n ri

i

(1

i=1

with the variables defined as follows:
RDmnthe state's objective function;
B the ith revenue base. The Bi base isassumed to be a function of
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Demand and Supply Conditions: State C

r , e.g., Bi

Bi(r

i)

and furthermore,3 Bi-< 0; that is, an increase

in the ith tax rate reduces the ith tax base.
ri: the ith tax rate associated with the ith tax base.

The state's objective function then can be stated as attempting to
maximize the revenue collected from all of the state's tax revenue

sources. We are explicitly assuming that the tax bases are independent. Furthermore, we assume that the state taxes only to meet
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expenditure obligations as determined in the state's budget. And for
analytical purposes, we also shall assume that the state maintains an
annually balanced budget. Therefore, we may restate the objective
function in terms of a constrained optimization problem. 7
n

•W

n

-

Maximize: L, = i2Z1 riB' + X(Q0 - iZ1 r'B 1)

(1')

where X is the undetermined Lagrangian multiplier and QO is the
predetermined expenditures for any given period. An examination of
the N tax rate partial derivatives of the first order conditions yields
the following not so surprising results:
( -)

(r' daBi + Bi) = 0

(2)

dri
fori= 1, ... ,N.

or stating the same thing somewhat differently:
MRi = MRJ,

i*:j

(2')

where the MR's represent marginal tax revenues. Therefore, each of
the tax rates should be increased until the marginal contributions
from all tax sources are equal."
2. Maximize tax exportation (independent tax bases) 9
A state which is attempting to maximize tax exportation may be
viewed as having an objective function of the following form:
N ribi t
Maximize: R2 =
rbr1
(3)
i=1
The variables in this objective function are defined as follows:
R 2 : the state's objective function;

bit: the ith reverse base, which includes only that portion of the
base which is paid by non-state residents. Again, it is assumed
that bi t = bit(r i ) and dbt i < 0;
dr

ri: the tax rate associated with the ith base.
7. For simplicity, we are ignoring collection costs in this formulation; their inclusion
would alter the equilibrium conditions slightly. However, given that most collection costs
for major taxes are small in relation to revenue collection, the simplification is justified.
8. In this formulation, we know, of course, that X= 1. We are assuming that the total
revenue requirements are such that all the MR1 s are greater than zero.
9. This model has been more fully developed and tested for general state taxes in Hogan
and Shelton, supra note 2.
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The constrained objective function appears as follows:
N •.
N rii t
Z rB
+ X(Q
Maximize L2 : iA
O

(3)

where, once again, X represents the undetermined Lagrangian multipier, Q0 is the predetermined budgeted expenditures, ri is the ith
tax rate associated with the ith tax base Bi . The tax base B1 is the
base of state and non-state tax revenue sources; Bi = bit +
combined
bi"
b.
Solving for X in the first N equations of the first order conditions
yields the following:
i

bit + r

X-

dbit

dri
i

(4)

i

B + r dB1

dr

=

with i 1, .... , N.
The numerator can be looked at as the marginal revenue from the
exported taxes and the denominator represents the marginal revenue
from both bases. This equation tells us that the state should structure
its taxes so that, for all taxes, the ratio of the marginal contribution
from out-of-state residents to the total marginal contribution should
be equal for all taxes.
C. Geometric Interpretationof Maximization Goals and
the Severance Tax
The effect of increasing the severance tax can be demonstrated
geometrically by turning to Figures 1-3. The tax shifts the supply
curve upward and to the left, from S to S,, resulting in a smaller
quantity being supplied from the intrastate supply, e.g., QT to QT,
in Figures 1 and 2 and QD to QD2 in Figure 3.
In pursuing the goal of maximizing tax revenue, a state would
increase the tax rate until the equilibrium price is in the elastic
portion of the total demand curve. The exact amount of the tax
increase would depend upon the relative demand and supply elasticities.' 0 The resulting distribution of the tax burden between intra10. The reason the optimum tax would mean an equilibrium price and quantity in the
elastic portion of the demand curve is essentially the same reason a monopolist will always
operate in the elastic portion of his demand curve.
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state and interstate markets depends upon the relative position of the
respective markets.' I In Figures 1 and 2 this objective is shown by a
shift in the supply curve from S to S2, with the resulting equilibrium
price and quantities being P2 and QD2 'QX2 and QT2"
Pursuing the goal of maximizing tax exportation would lead the
state to adopt a tax which would equate marginal costs to marginal
tax gain, but in this situation, the decision is made in terms of the
interstate demand curve. The price decision in terms of the interstate
demand curve dictates, in turn, the equilibrium price and quantity
relationship along the total demand curve. In Figures 1 and 2 this
objective is shown by a shift in the supply curve to S from S,with
the equilibrium price and quantities being P,, and QDI' QX1 and
QT,
Figures 1 and 2 indicate that pursuing a goal of maximizing tax
exportation leads to a higher tax than the alternative goal of maximizing tax revenue in State A but not in State B.
However, a determination of which tax policy will lead to a higher
tax depends upon the relative position and elasticities of the intrastate and interstate demands. In general we may observe that the
more dominant the interstate market, the tax exportation goal will
lead to higher severance taxes than the goal of simply maximizing
total tax payments.
D. State Objective Functions and Interdependent Tax Bases
To this point, the analysis has ignored an important problem in
natural resource severance taxation, the interdependence of the property tax and the severance tax. This interdependence can be critical
for developing a state or regional policy towards natural resource
taxation.
It is clear, that the ad valorem property tax will have the opposite
effect from a severance tax on the state supply curve, for "it will
encourage the owners to mine out from under the tax." ' 2 In other
words, the tax will change the profit stream over time and make
current production relatively more attractive than future production.
In terms of our figures, the effect of the tax is to shift the supply
curve to the right during any given time period. Therefore, depending
upon relative elasticities and time preferences, the effect of the sever11. The elasticity of the total demand curve at any given price is the weighted sum of the
individual demand curves at that price. The weights are the respective proportions of quantity to total quantity.
12. H. GROVES, FINANCING GOVERNMENT 315 (5th Ed. 1958).
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ance tax can be offset, to some degree, by the property tax. Stated
somewhat differently, the severance tax has the tendency to reduce
the quantity supplied at any given market price and the property tax
has the tendency to increase the quantity supplied at any given market price.
We are now in a position to return to our basic models and formally state the implication of interdependence.
1. Maximization of tax revenue (dependent tax bases)
We shall assume that the relationship between the two taxes is as
follows:
Bi = Bi(r', r i+

) , with

B

ari

<0,

3Bi >0
ari+l

and
Bi+ lI = Bi+lI(ri+l), with dAi~L1 < 0.
dri+
The terms Bi and r i refer to the severance tax base and rate, and Bi+l
and ri+ l refer to the property tax base and rate. Our assumption
then is that the property tax rate affects the base of the severance
tax, but that the property tax base is functionally independent of the
severance tax during a given period.' ' As one would expect, maximizing expression (1'), we once again attain an expression for X
which is equal to one, to which we can give the same interpretation:
each of the tax rates should be increased until their marginal contributions are equal, inclusive of the contribution of the effects of the
property tax on the severance tax.
2. Maximize tax exportation (dependent tax bases)
We shall continue the dependence assumptions made in the previous analysis of tax maximization and dependent tax bases. We may
therefore maximize expression (3'). Solving for X in the first order
conditions, we derive the following expression:"
13. Actually, one would expect a functionally dynamic dependence, i.e., we would expect the property tax base in this period to depend on the severance tax rate in the
preceding period. However, if the rate of extraction is small in relation to the base, then the
dynamic aspects of the problem can be ignored.
14. In deriving this ratio, it was assumed that the property tax rate in this period does
ii
a
not affect the property tax base in this period, i.e., abi+lt
i++1
a3r

272
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This expression, which is symmetrical to (4), states that the ratio of

the exported bases over the ratio of the total bases should be equated
for all taxes.
E. State Interaction
Table 1 sets out the severance tax policy goals which would likely

be pursued by the three model states given what would appear to be
reasonable initial equilibrium demand elasticities.'

I

It is assumed

that State A's initial equilibrium intrastate demand (eD), interstate
TABLE 1
State Objectives and Tax Policies
Current
1. Maximize
State Equilibrium
Intrastate
Conditions
Consumption

2. Maximize
Total
Revenue

3. Maximize
Total Tax
Revenue

4. Maximize
Tax
Exportation

Increase tax

Increase tax
until ET > 1

Increase tax
until e X > 1

eD<I
A

eX < 1

Zero tax

until e T = 1

T <1
CD> 1
B

eX > I

Zero tax

Reduce tax

Small tax
increase or
small tax
decrease

Small tax
increase or
small tax
decrease

Zero tax

Zero tax

Zero tax

Zero tax

eT > 1
eD> 1
C

eX > 1
eT

>

15. The elasticity coefficients specified here are not intended to exhaust the possibilities.
For example, by assigning different weights to the ex and eD coefficients and assuming
different relationships for each, we can change the ET from greater than to less than one, or
vice versa.
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demand (eX), and total demand (ET) elasticities are all less than one.
States B and C, on the other hand, are assumed to face demand
elasticities greater than one. Turning to the respective maximization
cases, we find that in the first objective function which involved the
maximization of intrastate consumption, all three states prefer a zero
tax. Pursuing the second objective function of maximization of total
revenue, State A would prefer a severance tax increase, State B
would prefer a severance tax reduction to perhaps zero and State C
would prefer a zero tax. In the case the third objective function, that
of maximization of total tax revenue, State A would prefer a severance tax increase, State B would prefer either a small tax increase or
decrease and State C would prefer a zero tax. Finally, pursuing the
objective function of maximization of tax exportation would lead
State A to prefer a tax increase, State B to prefer a small tax increase
or decrease and State C to prefer a zero severance tax. Therefore,
only for objective function 1 is there no clear conflict in policy goals.
However, turning to the two goals which seem most reasonable for
coal, a potential conflict arises between the states. In almost all
severance tax policy decisions, State C will be in conflict with States
A and B. And as our analysis indicates, States A and B will be in
potential conflict. However, as will be discussed, through the use of
the property tax, this conflict can be lessened to some degree.
COAL PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION AND TAXATION
IN THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION
In the preceding section, alternative state objectives were described and the implications for their adoption were examined for
three model states within a region facing different demand and supply conditions. Before energy policies can be evaluated for the individual states in the Rocky Mountain Region and for the Region
itself, it is necessary to describe the current regional coal situation.
In 1975, coal production in the net exporting states of Arizona,
Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming exceeded 77
million tons with a production value, f.o.b. mines, of over $500
million. (See Table 2.)
Coal production in the Region increased rapidly in the first half of
the 1970's. Production in 1975 was more than 265 percent of the
production level in 1970. Moreover, the regional production level in
1975 was nearly 250 percent of the highest annual production level
prior to the 1970's, 1944, ever reported in the Minerals Yearbook
which records coal production by state beginning in 1929. The greatest expansion during the 1970's occurred in Montana and Wyoming.
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These states accounted for 61 percent of the Region's coal production in 1975 and 49 percent of production value. Although coal
production in each of the other four states was fairly comparable, a
range of 7 to 8.8 million tons, production value varied widely. Both
Colorado and Utah produce high priced metallurgical coal which
accounts for the high production value in these states in 1975 as
compared to Arizona and New Mexico.
The six states have approximately 183 billion tons of coal reserves
which are economically feasible to mine using existing technology.
Montana and Wyoming account for 87 percent of the Region's reserves. The 1975 production rate could be sustained for over 2,300
years.
The distribution of each state's production in 1974 is shown in
Table 3. The two largest producers, Montana and Wyoming are also
the largest exporters, accounting for over 75 percent of coal exports.
New Mexico is the largest exporter of coal in the form of electric
power. However, 98 percent of the Region's exports is accounted for
by coal, vis-a-vis coal in the form of electric power. Montana and
Wyoming consume the least amount of coal relative to their production. However, the figures are somewhat deceiving because they are
calculated on a net basis. For example, although Colorado coal consumption is about 97 percent of production, Colorado exports metallurgical coal and imports coal for electric power generation. In 1974
Colorado's coal exports amounted to 55.5 trillion B.T.U.'s and imports were 50 trillion B.T.U.'s.
Including the net importing states, Idaho and Nevada, coal exports
and coal exported as electric power net amount to nearly 46 percent
of coal production in the Rocky Mountain Region. Excluding the
two net importing states, the corresponding share is 56 percent.
There is considerable diversity in the coal tax structures of the six
exporting states. Four of the six states have severance taxes: Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, and Wyoming. However, severance
taxes in Colorado and New Mexico account for a very small share of
taxes paid by the coal industry. The Colorado and New Mexico coal
severance taxes generated only $50,000 and $261,000, respectively
in FY 1976 as compared to $29 million in Montana and $2.8 million
in Wyoming.' 6 The state and local coal tax laws are summarized for
each of the six states in Table 4.
Although all six states have a property tax in the sense that a local
16. J. Wead, The Incidence of State Severance Taxes on Coal and the Distribution of
Revenues Derived from Such Taxes, 26, The Council of State Governments, Lexington,
Kentucky, July, 1976.
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mill levy is imposed on a taxable base, only Arizona and Colorado
have conventional property taxes. In both states the tax base is the
present value of estimated gross revenue from the mine over its life
minus production and distribution costs. In the other four states, a
production tax is used in lieu of a local property tax.
All of the states employ an income tax except Wyoming. Two
states, Arizona and New Mexico, use a sales tax or gross receipts tax
which applies to coal sold as an intermediate good. The sales taxes
which exist in the other states apply to coal only at the retail level.
Finally, some of the states have special taxes which apply to the coal
industry. For example, New Mexico has a natural resource excise tax.
New Mexico is attempting to impose an electrical energy tax which
includes a tax credit on intrastate consumption but the legal status of
this tax is in question. Wyoming has a special severance tax which
will expire when tax revenues total $120 million.
A FY 1976 hypothetical tax bill study conducted by Leonard
Bronder indicates that there is considerable variance in the relative
importance of the various coal taxes in each of the six states.' 7 In
Montana, the severance tax accounts for over 70 percent of all state
and local taxes paid by the hypothetical surface mining company
Bronder used in his analysis. In Wyoming, the corresponding share is
41 percent. In Colorado, Arizona, Utah, and Wyoming the property
tax is most important, accounting for 87 percent, 75 percent, 73
percent, and 59 percent of total state and local taxes paid by the
hypothetical company, respectively. The corresponding proportions
in Montana and New Mexico are only 27 percent and 20 percent.
Again, the property taxes in Arizona and Colorado are conventional
property taxes while in the other four states annual production is the
tax base. The gross receipts tax is the most important coal tax in
New Mexico, accounting for over 50 percent of all state and local
taxes paid by the hypothetical coal firm. In Arizona, the gross receipts tax accounts for over 20 percent of coal taxes paid by the
hypothetical firm. The state income tax is not a major tax on the
coal industry relative to other taxes in any of the six states. According to Bronder, the income tax is most important in Utah, Colorado,
and New Mexico accounting for only 27 percent, 14 percent, and 12
percent of coal taxes paid by the hypothetical firm, respectively.
Three recent hypothetical tax bill studies indicate diversity in the
tax burden on the coal industry in the six states. The results of the
three studies are summarized in Table 5. The taxes are shown on a
17. L. Bronder, Taxation of Surface and Underground Coal Mining in Western States,
Western Governor's Regional Policy Office, Denver, Colorado (1976).

April 1977]

REGIONAL ENERGY POLICIES

TABLE 5
Comparison of Hypothetical Tax Bill Studies
(Tax per ton)*
Bronder2

Loomis'
Arizona
Colorado
Montana
New Mexico
Utah
Wyoming

$ .49
.09
1.51
.16
.08
.47

Surface
$ .46
.16
1.48
.26
.09
.43

Underground
$1.48
.45
1.55
.90
.23
1.36

West Va.
Research League3
__

$ .25
.62
__4

.44
1.00

*M. Loomis, Coal Taxes Paid in the Rocky Mountain States, Wyo. Mining Ass. (unpublished
report, 1975); L. Bronder, Taxation of Surface and Underground Coal Mining in Western
States, Western Governor's Regional Energy Policy Office, Denver, Colo. (August, 1976);
A Comparison of State Tax Burdens Imposed Upon the Coal Industry, West Virginia and
Selected States, West Virginia Research League, Inc. (1975).
'1975 severance, property and special taxes only; assumes production of 5 million tons per
year, value for tax purposes $21,250,000, surface mine operation.
1976 state and local taxes; assumes production of 9.2 million tons surface mine and 4.99
million tons underground mine.
51974 state and local taxes; assumes underground mine which produced and sold 1.2
million tons.
4
State was not included in the analysis.

per ton basis which of course does not take account of differences in
the value of the coal produced in each of the six states. However,
even if the taxes were adjusted to account for value per ton or
B.T.U.'s, the disparity would remain. The major criticism of hypothetical tax bill studies is that they assume homogenous production
functions for all firms.' 8 Despite this methodological weakness, the
three studies combined provide impressive evidence that there is wide
variance in the coal tax burden among the six states. It is not possible
to compare the results of the three studies because of different tax
years, different taxes; e.g., Loomis includes only severance, property,
and special taxes, and different characteristics of the hypothetical
mining firm. The Bronder study, which is based on the FY 1976 tax
year and includes all state and local taxes, indicates that Montana is
the highest coal tax state followed by Arizona, Wyoming, New Mexico, Colorado, and Utah.
REGIONAL ENERGY POLICIES

Three different model states were described in section one based
on different demand and supply conditions. State A was character18. See Zubrow, Some Difficulties with the Measurement of Comparative Tax Burdens
160, Nat'l. Tax Ass'n., Proc. Fifty-Fourth Ann. Conf. (1961).
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ized as having significant coal production relative to the national
market with the interstate market being larger than the intrastate
market. Montana and Wyoming are the coal producing states which
most closely resemble State A. They are the major coal producing
states in the Region, the interstate market is dominant and they have
the largest coal reserves. State B has relatively small total production
and the intrastate market is the larger of the two markets. Colorado,
Utah, and New Mexico most closely resemble State B. Their production levels are considerably lower than those of Montana and Wyoming and the intrastate market dominates. On the basis of markets
Arizona could be placed with Montana and Wyoming because the
interstate market is larger. However, Arizona has been classified with
Colorado, Utah and New Mexico because the level of coal production
is comparable to these states and because the interstate market, although larger, is not dominant. The sizes of the interstate and intrastate markets are comparable. Finally, State C was characterized as
being an importer of coal to meet intrastate coal demand. Nevada
and Idaho resemble State C.
One major policy issue is whether it is in the best interest of each
of the six coal exporting states to act as a tax exporting cartel and
impose uniform severance taxes. Of course, the answer to this question depends on the incidence of the tax and the price elasticity of
demand and supply facing the individual states. Assuming the supply
curve is not perfectly elastic, and given demand elasticities, it is
apparent that the severance tax is partially shifted forward in the
production process and is partially shifted backward to the owners of
the factors of production, including the mine owners. Regarding
demand, recent estimates of coal price elasticity for the Rocky
Mountain Region suggest that demand is inelastic.' 9 Price elasticities
for the individual states were not explicitly derived. However, it is
possible to make reasonable assumptions regarding the state coefficients. One would expect that, in general, the states resembling State
A will have more inelastic demand coefficients than the states resembling State B because they have a larger share of the national market.
Therefore, given the regional demand coefficients, it is reasonable to
assume that the price elasticity of demand facing the states in Group
A to be inelastic and the states in group B to be elastic or near
19. Estimates made by the U.S. Fed. Energy Admin. (Div. of Energy Systems, Modeling
& Forecasting) for the Rocky Mountain Region are as follows: 5 year, to 1980-(-.459); 10
year, to 1985-(-.552); and 15 year, to 1990-(-.556). These data are unpublished. For a
discussion of the derivation of the national coefficients see FEA, NATIONAL ENERGY
OUTLOOK, app. C, C4-C1O (1976). The states included in the region for the purpose of
making the estimates are Montana, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado and Idaho.
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unitary elasticity. It would follow then that states in group A should
be able to effectively use the severance tax to achieve tax exportation objectives because they are operating in the more inelastic portion of the demand curve. On the other hand, the states in group B
will not be able to impose as heavy a severance tax because of their
demand elasticity coefficients. Therefore, a federation of the exporting states developed for the purpose of maximizing regional tax
exportation through severance taxation would not be expected to
remain stable.
Assuming that the states in group B wish to maximize tax exportation they will have to rely relatively more on true property taxation
and relatively less on production taxes than the states in group A.
The incidence of the property tax will fall on the owners of the mine
in the form of a reduction in the capitalized value of the mine. Of
course, the property tax cannot be exported unless the coal mining
company is owned by out-of-state residents.
If the objective is to maximize tax revenue, in some cases a combination of severance (production) and property taxes is desirable.
Again, however, the states in group A would be expected to utilize
higher severance taxes and place less reliance on property taxes because demand is more inelastic. On the other hand, the states in
group B will not be able to utilize the severance tax as effectively
because they face more elastic demand. It is clear from the model
which depicted tax base dependence, that the states in group B will
choose a combination of property taxation and severance taxation.
The relative dependence will be determined by the equilibrium price
elasticity faced by each state. If the state is operating in the elastic
portion of the demand curve, it must place greater reliance on property taxes. As indicated by the model, in equilibrium, for each state
the marginal contribution of each tax will be equal.
It is interesting to note that the tax policies of the state in group A
should generate fewer political problems internally because of the
ability of these states to place greater reliance on the severance tax.
The incidence of severance taxes is diffused while the burden of coal
property taxes falls on the owners of the mine.
The states in group C cannot rely on the severance tax to maximize tax exportation because they are coal importers. Their only
choice is to employ property taxation for either state objective.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The central issue of this paper is whether a "taxing cartel" is a
feasible alternative for the states in the Rocky Mountain Region. The
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major focus has been on coal production and the severance tax. Of
course, a taxing cartel is similar to a regular cartel of sellers when
examining an individual member's behavior relative to other members' behavior; for if side payments or penalties are not permitted
and market conditions are not compatible with the objectives of the
cartel there will be a tendency for the participating parties to alter or
avoid the terms of the agreement and any federation will be unstable.
Four possible objectives were considered which a state might pursue, but only two of the objectives seemed reasonable or likely,
constrained total tax maximization and constrained tax exportation.
Furthermore, the paper described three model states which roughly
correspond to the types of states in the Rocky Mountain Region.
After relating the conditions which exist in the Region to the
models developed in the paper, it was predicted that any taxing
cartel agreements developed in the Region utilizing only the severance tax are likely to be unstable. Further, the analysis demonstrates
that the smaller coal producing states in the Region must rely more
heavily on the property tax rather than severance taxation to achieve
their objectives. Finally, the coal importing states must rely totally
on property taxation for either state objective. An examination of
the coal tax structure in the states comprising the Rocky Mountain
Region suggests that some states have tax policies which are consistent with maximization of tax exportation taking into account the
demand conditions facing the respective states, e.g., Arizona and
Montana.

